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Understanding Student Cognition Through
an Analysis of Their Preconceptions in Physics
Over the last three decades, many studies have been conducted to identify students’
preconceptions on various science topics. It is time now for a synthetic study of
preconceptions to enhance our understanding of students’ everyday cognition and to
benefit our effort in developing effective instructional inventions for conceptual change.
Through a classroom-based study, we collected quantitative and qualitative data about
students’ preconceptions in physics. Data analysis produced an in-depth understanding of
the features of students’ preconceptions and cognition. For example, we found that
students thought analogically as scientists did, but they used analogies differently. We also
found that students’ preconceptions were highly correlated and that some preconceptions
were more fundamental than others. Having the core preconception probably means having
many others. The pedagogical and research implications of these findings are highlighted.
Plusieurs études ont porté sur l’identification des idées préconçues qu’ont les élèves face à
divers thèmes en sciences. Il faut maintenant passer à une synthèse de ces préconceptions
pour améliorer notre connaissance du niveau de compréhension des élèves, d’une part, et
pour appuyer nos efforts visant le développement de matériel pédagogique efficace qui
mènera à des changements conceptuels, d’autre part. Une étude basée dans la salle de classe
a permis aux auteurs de recueillir des données quantitatives et qualitatives sur les idées
préconçues qu’ont les élèves au sujet de la physique. L’analyse des données a fourni des
informations détaillées sur les caractéristiques des préconceptions et de la cognition des
élèves. Par exemple, nous avons appris que les élèves raisonnent par analogie tout comme
les scientifiques, mais que les deux groupes ne se servent pas des analogies de la même
façon. De plus, nous avons noté une grande corrélation parmi les préconceptions des élèves
et avons découvert que certaines préconceptions étaient plus fondamentales que d’autres. Il
est probable que quand on tient la préconception de base, l’on en tient également plusieurs
autres. Nous soulignons les répercussions de ces conclusions, tant pour la pédagogie que la
recherche.
Introduction
Since the late 1970s, scholars have become increasingly aware that students
come to school with their own understanding of the world (Driver, Guesne, &
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Tiberghien, 1985). In the literature this preconceived knowledge is often called
student preconceptions. Preconceptions have been identified in various areas of
science. In classical physics, for example, the following preconceptions have
been documented. Forces are needed to maintain the motion (Clement, 1982;
McCloskey, 1983); a force can be given to an object in the name of “impetus”
(Berg & Brouwer, 1991; Clement; McCloskey); a heavy body falls faster than a
light one (Champagne & Klopfer, 1980); gravity is related to the earth alone
(Bar, Zinn, & Rubin, 1997); and heat is a kind of material substance (Erickson,
1979, 1980).
Preconceptions serve as a platform from which students interpret their
world. Unfortunately, in most cases preconceptions are quite different from
scientific notions. Learning under these circumstances involves the restructur-
ing of preconceptions. This restructuring is referred to as conceptual change
(Vosniadou, 1999). Some teaching strategies have been designed to foster con-
ceptual change (Martinez, 2001; Scott, Asoko, & Driver, 1992). One of the
earliest and yet famous conceptual change models was proposed by Posner,
Strike, Hewson, and Gertzog (1982). Paralleling the conditions of scientific
revolutions (Kuhn, 1970), Posner et al. stated that several important conditions
must be fulfilled before any conceptual change occurs. These conditions could
be briefly described in terms of students’ dissatisfaction with the old concep-
tion and the intelligibility, plausibility, and fruitfulness of the new conception.
Posner et al.’s model correctly addresses the importance of cognitive conflict in
conceptual change (Tao & Gunstone, 1999; Zhou, Brouwer, Nocente, & Martin,
2005). Many instructional strategies proposed to address student preconcep-
tions such as Prediction-Observation-Explanation share a common feature of
confronting students with discrepant events that contradicted their concep-
tions (Scott et al.). Through the use of discrepant events, students are expected
to experience cognitive disequilibration that will induce them to reconstruct
knowledge.
A cognitive disequilibration, however, cannot guarantee a conceptual
change. As some scholars point out, the reactions of students to a discrepant
event vary (Demastes, Good, & Peebles, 1996; Tao & Gunstone, 1999). En-
thusiastic students welcome conceptual conflicts, but unsuccessful students
ignore them. Some students can recognize the existence of conceptual conflicts
whereas others fail to do so. Some students replace their preconceptions with
scientific ones whereas others keep two distinct conceptions applying in dif-
ferent contexts. Therefore, some other variables influence conceptual change
learning. A number of educational psychologists who are interested in study-
ing the effects of goal, motivation, interest, and so forth on learning brought
insights to the improvement of Posner et al.’s model. Pintrich, Marx, and Boyle
(1993) criticized Posner et al.’s model as a “cool” or “isolated” model because it
focuses on cognitive and rational factors and ignores the nonrational aspect of
learning. They called for a serious consideration of motivational constructs in
the effort to understand the process of conceptual change. Even Strike and
Posner (1992) themselves, 10 years after they first published their model, ex-
pressly noted that “motives and goals and the institutional and social sources
of them need to be considered” (p. 10) in conceptual change models.
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Following Pintrich et al.’s (1993) article, a warming trend in contrast to the
cold nature of Posner et al.’s (1982) model took place in conceptual change
research (Sinatra, 2005). The Cognitive Reconstruction of Knowledge Model
(CRKM) by Dole and Sinatra (1998) and the Cognitive-Affective Model of
Conceptual Change (CAMCC) by Gregoire (2003) are two typical examples of
warm models that incorporate motivational constructs into the complexity of
conceptual change learning. The CRKM describes how learner and message
characteristics interact, leading to a degree of engagement with the new con-
cept. The learner characteristics entail existing knowledge and motivational
factors. The strength and coherence of a learner’s existing knowledge and his
or her commitment to this knowledge influence the likelihood of conceptual
change. Motivational factors refer to a learner’s interest, emotional involve-
ment, self-efficacy, importance, need for cognition, as well as the social context
that supports or undermines his or her motivation. Message characteristics
refer to the features of the instructional content or persuasive discourse
designed to promote conceptual change, which can be described using con-
junctives such as comprehensible, coherent, plausible, and rhetorically compelling. It
is the interaction of the existing knowledge, instructional message, and in-
dividual motivational factors that creates a space for knowledge reconstruc-
tion. The CAMCC shares much similarity with the CRKM, but posits a great
role for affective constructs such as anxiety and fear in conceptual change.
Gregoire (2003) claimed that stress and threat appraisals “happen automatical-
ly before characteristics of the message are seriously considered” (p. 168); that
is, the message characteristics may never be fully processed by a learner if the
affective appraisals create a strong tendency to dismiss the message. The
CAMCC was proposed to interpret teachers’ resistance to reform-oriented
curricula that conflicted with their teaching beliefs. It therefore reads as more
suitable for the case of belief change. However, because the conceptual change
in science involves self-efficacy beliefs and epistemological beliefs (Andre &
Windschitl, 2003), the CAMCC provides insights about instructional inven-
tions that take affective appraisals into account.
Purposes of the Study
Reflecting on the past studies in preconceptions and conceptual change, we
believed that two things needed to be explored further. First, over three
decades of studies on preconceptions have produced knowledge about
students’ ideas on various scientific topics, but provided little insight into the
correlation between preconceptions, even for those from the same subject
domain. Although some study reports or arguments try to interpret the charac-
teristics of preconceptions (Driver, Asoko, & Leach, 1994), a need still exists for
experimental studies that explore the general nature of students’ preconcep-
tions. Second, the theory of conceptual change needs improvement. The CRKM
and CAMCC describe a process of conceptual change that involves cognitive,
motivational, and affective constructs, leading to a choice between the existing
knowledge and message; however, they have little description about the pre-
sentation of the instructional message. How do learners become aware of the
instructional message before they struggle for a position between the existing
knowledge and message, to be told or socially invented or constructed? To us
this is one of the most fundamental issues in teaching and learning for concep-
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tual change. Martinez (2001) observed that the theory of conceptual change had
gained little significant progress since 1975. Although we believe that he might
be overly negative considering the recent contributions of educational psycho-
logists such as Pintrich, Sinatra, and Gregoire, we believe that more efforts are
necessary in the conceptual change study.
It was our intention in this study to inform the further development of
effective teaching approaches for conceptual change by studying the cognitive
processes behind students’ preconceptions. We believe that a synthetic study
of student preconceptions that examines the common features of these precon-
ceptions and the correlation between them can provide us with insights about
student cognition. Based on a project spanning several years, in this article we
report our findings about the following research questions. What are the com-
mon characteristics of student preconceptions? How are they related to each
other? What features of student cognition can be inferred from analysis of
student preconceptions?
Methodology
Over the last few years we have been developing and evaluating computer
simulations designed to address well-known student preconceptions. The data
and findings reported in this article are drawn from four control classes com-
prising 361 students who were registered in an introductory algebra-based
physics course. This course was set up for the first- or second- year university
students from various science-related departments and covered the topics of
kinematics, dynamics, and heat.
To investigate students’ conceptions, a conceptual test was administered at
the beginning and end of the course. Interviews with students were conducted
while the course was in progress to gain in-depth understanding of their ideas.
The interviewees were selected from those students who had more problems
with conceptual understanding in the pre-test. Real-time class observations
were carried out during the course. The interaction between the teacher and
students was recorded in journals and analyzed after class. Students’ assign-
ments were reviewed in order to gain more insight into students’ actual con-
ceptions. In addition, a physics clinic was set up by Zhou to help students with
any problems in learning physics. Just as a physician does in a medical clinic,
he started his clinical service with a diagnosis. When students asked a question,
he always requested that they attempt the question first and explain their own
solution, and then he worked on the critical points where students failed. The
clinic provided him with wonderful opportunities to know what students were
thinking when facing a question.
The instrument for conceptual tests was a combination of the Force Concept
Inventory (FCI), which has 30 questions, plus three more questions taken from
the literature. We therefore call our instrument the FCI-Plus. The first version
of the FCI was published by Hestenes, Wells, and Swackhammer (1992), and a
slightly modified version was published by Mazur (1997). The FCI was
designed to test students’ conceptual understanding of Newtonian mechanics.
One of its outstanding features is that the questions were designed to explore
the understanding of basic concepts in a way that was understandable to the
novice who had never taken a physics course, while at the same time being
rigorous enough for a person with training in physics. All the questions are of
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a conceptual nature. They were not produced to cover fully the domain of
mechanics, but created for the topics on which students most often have
preconceptions. To answer these questions, simply recalling the definition of a
concept is not enough: students rather need to understand the underlying
concepts and to be able to apply these concepts to diverse situations. Therefore,
these questions can solicit students’ intuitive concepts and concurrently test
their understanding of concepts. The FCI has been widely and successfully
used to test the effectiveness of physics classes (Hake, 1998; Redish, Saul, &
Steinberg, 1997; Redish & Steinberg, 1999). The three extra questions were
adapted from the literature (Berg & Brouwer, 1991; Whitaker, 1983). They were
used to study students’ conceptions about the independence of motion com-
ponents and gravity in space, which the FCI does not cover.
Because all the questions in the FCI-Plus were developed and widely used
by university scholars, the validity of the FCI-Plus in testing students’ concep-
tual understanding should not be a problem. For the reliability of the FCI-Plus,
we used the split-half method to estimate the reliability coefficient in all in-
volved classes, which resulted in a value of 0.90. We used another method—
Kuder-Richardson 20—and obtained a result of 0.89. These results confirm a
high reliability of the FCI-Plus test.
Because the FCI-Plus covers a range of topics including motion and force,
action and reaction forces, velocity and acceleration, and gravity, and so forth,
and addresses a range of student preconceptions, it provides us with an oppor-
tunity to investigate the correlation of students’ preconceptions and examine
their common features..
Data Analysis and Findings
In order to identify students’ preconceptions and check their conceptual
growth over the course, the conceptual test results were analyzed in two steps.
First, the test was taken as an ordinary test, which means students received one
mark for each question that they answered correctly. The class means for the
pre- and post-tests were calculated and are reported in Table 1. In the second
step, an item analysis was conducted on the test. Each question has several
distracters that represent possible preconceptions that students may have on
the topic covered by the question. By analyzing students’ response distribution
among the distracters for each question, we were able to identify student
preconceptions on the topics covered by the test. These findings were triangu-
lated with the qualitative data collected from the interviews, class observa-
tions, assignment review, and clinical diagnosis. Table 2 lists the major
preconceptions we discovered from this study.
After students’ preconceptions were identified, we investigated the connec-
tions between preconceptions from both quantitative and qualitative angles.
Table 1
Class Means of the FCI-Plus Test (Full Mark is 33)
Class 1 2 3 4 Overall
Class size 81 76 99 105 361
Pre-test mean 16.8 16.6 15.4 16.5 16.3
Post-test mean 18.3 17.6 16.6 18.1 17.6
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For each identified preconception, students who demonstrated it in the test
were assigned 1, and the rest who did not have this preconception were
assigned 0. In doing this we generated 14 sets of data for the studied students
that corresponded to each preconception in Table 2. The Pearson correlation
coefficient was calculated for each pair of preconceptions. We found that the
correlation between preconceptions varied from one pair to another. Table 3
reports these significant correlations (p<0.01). With a belief that preconceptions
are related to each other, we integrated the qualitative data to generate a
connected picture of various preconceptions. This examination is infused in the
following section.
Our final data analysis task is based on the analysis described above to
synthesize our quantitative and qualitative data in order to identify features of
students’ preconceptions and to understand students’ cognition behind these
preconceptions. To this end, we sometime traveled back and forth between our
data and other persons’ findings so that we could ensure that our conclusions
were well situated in the research literature.
Discussion
Characteristics of Student Preconceptions
Preconceptions versus scientific concepts. As Table 2 reports, student preconcep-
tions were clustered around the following main topics of Newtonian physics:
gravity, action and reaction forces, the relationship between force and motion,
the connections among position, velocity and acceleration, and the principle of
the independence of motion components. Student preconceptions found in this
study were quite different from scientific concepts. This finding has been
documented by many earlier studies. For examples, According to Newton’s
Third Law, the action and reaction forces are always equal but appositely
directed. In contrast, 67% of students in the pre-test thought a heavy truck
exerted a bigger force on a compact car than the force the car exerted on the
Table 2
Students’ Preconceptions in Mechanics
Number Students’ preconceptions
P1 Heavier bodies fall faster than lighter ones.
P2 There is no gravity on the moon.
P3 Greater mass exerts greater force.
P4 Most active agent produces the largest force.
P5 Only active agents exert force; obstacles exert no force.
P6 Motion implies force. As soon as the force stops, the motion stops.
P7 Largest force determines the motion.
P8 Velocity is somewhat proportional to applied force.
P9 Students view the impetus of an object as a force.
P10 Impetus dissipates while an object moves against resistance.
P11 There exists a centrifugal force.
P12 Objects have the same velocity at the moments that they move side by side.
P13 Students confuse acceleration with position or with velocity.
P14 Students did not realize that components of motion act simultaneously and
independently.
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truck when they collided (preconception #3). According to Newton’s First and
Second Laws, a force changes motion, but is not necessary to maintain motion
with a constant velocity, and a moving body may experience a force in the
opposite direction of its motion. For many of the students studied, however,
the relationship between motion and force became much simpler. These stu-
dents thought that wherever and whenever there was a motion, there must be
a force (preconception #6). About 76% of students in the pre-test insisted that a
child experienced a force in the direction of his motion on a swing. When an
elevator was pulled up with a constant speed by a cable, 73% of students
thought that the upward force exerted by the cable must be bigger than the
downward force (preconception #7). 
Preconception and culture. Although the literature continually reports the
effect of cultures on children’s world view, our study suggested that students
from varied countries have similar preconceptions about force and motion.
Clement (1982) reported that college students in the United States thought a
force (impetus) could be given to an object and that any motion implied a force.
Viennot (1979) found that high school and university students from France,
Britain, and Belgium thought that force was proportional to velocity and that
action forces equaled reaction forces only when bodies were at equilibrium.
Our study shows that Canadian university students shared similar preconcep-
tions with their peers from other countries.
Preconception and age. Berg and Brouwer (1991) tested 315 grade 9 students
in Edmonton, Canada, and found that students thought force (impetus) could
be given to an object, that a force was required in the direction of motion, and
that there was no gravity in space and on the moon. Champagne and Klopfer
(1980) stated that grades 7 or 8 students in the US thought that heavier bodies
fell faster than lighter bodies. Erickson and Agurirre (1984) reported that high
Table 3
 Correlation Between Preconceptions
P6 P7 P8 P9 P10
P6 Pearson Correlation 1.000 .163** .162** .294** .336**
Sig. (2-tailed) - .003 .004 .000 .000
N 328 328 308  290 328
P7 Pearson Correlation .163** 1.000 .331** .194** .202**
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 - .000 .001 .000
N 328 328 308 290 328
P8 Pearson Correlation .162** .331** 1.000 .171** .232**
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .000 - .004 .000
N 308 308 308 288 308
P9 Pearson Correlation .294** .194** .171** 1.000 .405**
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .004 - .000
N 290  290 288 290 290
P10 Pearson Correlation .336** .202** .232** .405** 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 .000 -
N 328 328  308 290 329
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
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school students generally did not think of the components of motion as inde-
pendent. Our study revealed that although college students are normally older
than high school students, students in colleges and high schools shared similar
intuitive understanding of these topics. And more surprising, for some precon-
ceptions the portion of college students who had these preconceptions was
close to that of high school students. For example, Berg and Brouwer reported
that 29.5% of grade 9 students thought that there was no gravity on the moon.
Our study found that 25% of university students held this preconception
before the introductory physics course and 24% after it.
Preconception and the history of science. As shown in Table 2, many of the
students studied, as did people of Aristotle’s time, thought that heavier bodies
fell faster than lighter ones (preconception #1), that a force was required to
maintain a motion (preconception #6), and that a force or impetus could be
given to an object (preconception #9). Student preconceptions are, therefore,
reminiscent of conceptions that are well known from the history of science.
This finding is compatible with the study report of Bar and Zinn (1998), who
observed that a parallelism exists between student concepts and historical
concepts concerning action at a distance.
Preconception and experience. During the interviews, when students were
asked why they thought there was a force in the direction of the motion of a
pendulum, they said, “[a force] keeps the ball moving this way [along the
curve].” Two student interviewees did hands-on experiments to support their
ideas. One student pushed the teacup on a desk and said, “[I] push it and it
moves. [I] stop pushing and it stops moving.” The other student pushed a
pencil on a desk instead of a cup and made similar remarks (students were
interviewed individually). These examples indicate to us that students’ precon-
ceptions arose from their experiences.
Difficulty of conceptual change. In our study many preconceptions did not
change much after a four-month university physics course. For example, at the
beginning of the course approximately 76% of students believed in the exist-
ence of a force exerted in the direction of a child’s movement on a swing. After
the course 64% of students still held this conception (preconception #6).
Preconception #3 was also persistent. Of our tested university students, 67%
thought that a big truck exerted a larger force on a small car during a head-on
collision in the pre-test. In the post-test 52% of students still held this precon-
ception. Preconception #9 was also found to be resistant to change. In the
pre-test, 58% of students thought that a tennis ball experienced a force (im-
petus) produced by the player, and 55% still thought the same in the post-test.
In short, preconceptions were found difficult to change through traditional
teaching.
Preconception and context. Our study indicated that students’ conceptions
appeared to be context-dependent. Although after the course almost all the
students knew that a satellite experienced a gravitational force in space, many
still did not realize that the moon also exerted a gravitational force on objects
near its surface (preconception #2). About 50% of students in the post-test
indicated that there was no gravity on the moon. Another example concerns
students’ understanding of the ability of obstacles to exert force (preconception
#5). Whereas about 10% of students in the pre-test and 4% of students in the
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post-test failed to notice the force that the floor applies on the chair, 28% of
students in the pre-test and 18% of students in the post-test failed to see the
force that the ice surface exerts on a hockey puck.
Driver (1989) and von Glaserfeld (1995) have made a point that in most
cases children’s conceptions make sense to the children themselves. They have
their own ways of construing events and phenomena that are coherent within
their domain of experience. Our findings do not totally agree with this idea of
coherence, but stay in the same line with the report of Lijnse (1990). Lijnse
stated that students held varied conceptions of energy in varied problem
situations. We found that students’ understanding about physics topics such as
gravitational force and normal force may vary from context to context.
Conceptual change and instruction. This study indicated that careful instruc-
tional design is necessary to change preconceptions. Learners often fail to see
the connections among the topics taught in class. Students may learn by rote
due to a lack of strategies and abilities to build a big picture of physics or an
absence of intention to make the extra effort needed to extend their learning to
new situations. It does not seem difficult to relate the gravity of the moon with
the universal law of gravitation, but many participant students could not apply
this conceptual transfer in the test. During interviews, when students were
reminded of the source of the gravitational force and the universal law of
gravitational force, most students who had thought that there was no gravity
on the moon changed their minds.
Students can transfer knowledge if they are directed properly and explicitly
to extend their basic principles to new situations. Careful instructional design
is therefore necessary to overcome many preconceptions. Novak (1977)
claimed that the meaning of a concept is defined and strengthened by the
network of propositions that students have connected to it. The case discussed
above shows the importance of building a big picture of physics and general-
izing applications of the principles of physics to as many situations as possible.
Teachers should not take for granted that students will transfer their under-
standing of physical laws and principles to new situations, although this trans-
fer might appear straightforward to the teacher.
Features of Students’ Cognition
Students’ thinking and analogy. Analogies play an important role in scientists’
work. For example, in the early 20th century, based on the knowledge that an
atom has positive and negative charges, scientists proposed several models
about atomic structure through analogy. Thomson in 1903 proposed a plum-
pudding model of atomic structure. In this model an atom was described as a
volume of positive charges with electrons embedded throughout the volume,
much like raisins in thick pudding or seeds in a watermelon. In 1901 Perrin
compared an atom to the solar system, stating that the element with positive
charges was located at the center of an atom in the same way that the sun was
at the center of the solar system, and electrons were seen as planets orbiting the
sun. Nagaoka in 1903 proposed a Saturn-like model. According to this model,
there was a core at the center of an atom consisting of positive charges and a
Saturn ring-like band outside the core on which electrons were distributed. In
our study we found that students thought through analogies as scientists did.
Students viewed an object as a container. It could store impetus or the force as
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a result of an action. For example, one test question asks what force(s) acts on a
tennis ball after it has left contact with the racquet and before it touches the
ground. Over 55% of students in pre- and post-tests thought that the ball
experienced “a force by the ‘hit.’” Just as a car runs on gas, an object would
move on impetus. An object would slow down while the impetus was dissipat-
ing. Impetus was thus seen as a kind of “go power.” When interviewed about
the force(s) a ball would experience after being thrown up, one interviewee
made a gesture of throwing a ball up. A typical response was that the “intrinsic
force” (caused by the action of throwing) was used up when the ball went up
against gravity. The pushing action of people was probably seen as a metaphor
or prototype for force action. Because the floor or surface could not “push,”
some students failed to indicate the normal force that the floor acts on a chair
or that the surface of the ice acts on a hockey puck. When asked to explain their
choice in the case of a hockey puck, these students typically replied, “I don’t see
any other things pushing the puck. The puck only moves horizontally, doesn’t
it?” The social or life phenomenon that the stronger party plays a dominating
role was another metaphor students probably used to interpret dynamic
processes. They thought that the strongest force determined the motion. For
example, in such a situation as an elevator being pulled up by a cable with a
uniform speed, some students thought that the upward force applied by the
cable must be bigger than the downward force of gravity because the elevator
was pulled up. Following a similar reasoning, students believed that the force
applied by a woman who was pushing a box forward with a constant speed
should be larger than the total resisting force because the box was pushed
forward.
Students’ thinking and context. Students’ approaches of using analogies are
different from those of scientists. Based on their current knowledge, scientists
use an analogy to guide their further investigation of a phenomenon as illus-
trated by the study of atomic structure described above. Students, however,
use an analogy to interpret a phenomenon. Therefore, their concepts are most
often phenomenological in nature. One test question asks what force(s) act(s)
on a ball that is thrown up. Some students thought an upward force (impetus)
acted on the ball even after the ball left the hand. Another test question de-
scribes a ball shot into a frictionless curved channel that is anchored to a
horizontal table top. Some students thought the ball experienced a force in the
direction of motion (impetus) inside the channel and would continually move
in a curve after it left the other end of the channel. From these two examples we
understood that students thought impetus had only one dimension in the case
of linear motion; however, in the case of a circular motion, they saw impetus as
a kind of bendable matter keeping an object moving in a curve. It was clear that
students had no fixed definition of impetus. It was just a tool that they used to
interpret a situation. In other words, the meanings of students’ concepts could
change in other contexts.
Students’ concepts were often mixed together and undifferentiated. Thus
words such as force, energy, and power were often used interchangeably by the
students under study. In the case that a boy throws a ball up in the air, a
conversation between an interviewee and the first author went like this.
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R: What forces are acting on the ball when the ball goes up?
S: Gravity is always there. It is downward. And an applied force; it is upward.
R: Where does that force come from?
S: The boy. He threw the ball up. (with a gesture of throwing a ball up)
R: You mean that force is still acting after the ball leaves the boy’s hand?
S: Hm.… Well, I mean the energy the boy put on the ball. It keeps the ball
moving up.
Students’ thinking and perception. Only a small number of students who held
preconception #3 in the pre-test changed their minds after instruction. The
application of Newton’s Third Law in non-equilibrium interactions still proved
to be elusive. The fact that one object damaged the other appeared to create a
conceptual obstacle for them to believe that the action force was, even in this
kind of case, still equal to the reaction force. In such a complex case students
were often attentive to some visible variables and ignored others. In a complex
situation such as a collision, other factors such as anti-collision design of
vehicles are involved in the damage caused. This might complicate the situa-
tion and made it difficult for students to focus on the nature of forces involved
in the collision.
Another example demonstrating the great influence of perceptions on stu-
dent cognition is the lack of discrimination between position, velocity, and
acceleration. One test question poses a situation illustrated by Figure 1. The
positions of two moving blocks at successive equal time intervals were given to
students on a graph (one moves with a uniform velocity and the other ac-
celerates). Students were asked to answer if the blocks ever had the same
speed. Over a quarter of the studied students thought that the two blocks had
the same speed at the moment they moved side by side. For these students,
being ahead in position meant having a bigger velocity, and a bigger distance
meant a bigger acceleration (preconception #13). The variables such as the
initial position and velocity were often ignored in students’ intuitive thinking.
During an interview, a student told us an interesting story that clearly
demonstrated his perception-based thinking. The student was asked to predict
which path a ball, which was swung in a circular path in a horizontal plane,
would follow after the string suddenly broke, this student answered the ques-
tion correctly: “The ball would go straight out along the tangential line of the
circle.” However, he came up with this choice not through the application of
Newton’s First Law, but rather by thinking of a track-and-field meet. An
athlete throws a discus after he makes a few turns. If the discus did not go
straight forward, it would hit the spectators sitting on the sidelines. This was
how he concluded that the discus or the ball must go straight along the
tangential line. The same interviewee told us another interesting story. The
teacher was giving an example of problem-solving after he taught the prin-
Figure 1. The positions of two moving blocks at successive equal time intervals.
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ciples associated with the rotational motion of a rigid object. The question was
to determine the minimum angle between a ladder and the ground in order to
keep the ladder from slipping off when a person steps onto it. The student told
us that when the teacher solved this problem, his mind momentarily went back
to the time many years ago when his father had adjusted the position of a
ladder before he stepped onto it to fix the roof of their house. He was standing
beside him when his father did this. The flash of this recall made the situation
of the question closer to this student’s real life and reportedly made the solu-
tion more meaningful and easier for him to understand.
Perception-dominated cognition was said by Piaget (1970) to be a feature of
young children’s knowing. Our study indicated that this feature still exists to
some degree even when children grow up to university age. It is clear that the
cognition of university students still relies strongly on visible facts or concrete
experiences. This finding is consistent with the statement of Schlenker and
Perry (1983) that nearly half of college students are still not good at abstract
reasoning and that their thinking still possesses some features of the concrete
operational stage defined by Piaget.
The interpretation-orientated and perception-dependent nature of student
cognition was often flawed in a logical sense. In this study, we found that
students often confused sufficient conditions with necessary conditions. For
students, that A caused B (the event A was a sufficient condition for the event
B to occur) meant that B must need A (the event A became a necessary condi-
tion for the event B). Such facts as people pushing a box across a floor became
evidence for students to think that motion implied force. They did not see the
difference between what makes the object move and what keeps it moving.
Among the closely connected concepts of force, inertia, momentum, and ener-
gy, students did not know which they should start with in order to solve a
problem.
Structure of preconceptions. Our calculation of the correlation between
preconceptions revealed that student preconceptions in dynamics were sig-
nificantly related to each other (Table 3). Having one preconception probably
means having many others. Figure 2 represents our examination of the content
connections between preconceptions. The preconception “motion implies (net)
force” is at the center, and other preconceptions could be a direct deduction
from this concept when applied in various situations. For example, in the case
of a falling body, the following deduction can easily lead to the conclusion that
heavier objects fall faster than lighter ones.
1. A force is required by motion.
2. Heavier bodies experience a bigger force.
3. Therefore, heavier bodies fall faster.
We were convinced that students build their own hierarchical conceptual
structures based on their own imperfect logic and vague concepts. 
Most students who possessed the core preconception in the pre-test did not
change their minds in the post-test. For example, 64% of students in the post-
test still believed that a child who was swinging freely experienced a force in
the direction of the motion. Therefore, it was no wonder that other preconcep-
tions did not change much. Students’ everyday cognition concerning dynamics
phenomena survived through the course. This led to the poor performance of
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students in both pre- and post- conceptual tests. In our study students’ average
scores of 16.3 in the pre-test and 17.6 in the post-test out of 33 were below the
conceptual threshold, 60% correct, set up by Hestenes and Wells (1992). Below
this threshold a student’s understanding of Newtonian concepts is too limited
for effective problem-solving.
Educational Implications
The findings of this study apply to first- or second-year university students.
However, because our findings were concluded from analyzing students’
preconceptions, most of which were formed in their early life experience and
survived through school to university, we believe that these findings probably
apply to school students with little deviation. Of course, this statement is
subject to further research.
Some implications for the research and teaching in science education can be
drawn with respect to our findings. We found that students thought through
analogies. This provides justification for those studies that are designed to
investigate the effectiveness of using analogies in science teaching. As Dagher
(1995) stated, based on a review of studies on the use of analogies in science
education, analogies are a valuable teaching strategy, but undesired conse-
quence may take place as a result of inappropriate use of analogies. Further
research on students’ cognitive processes behind the analogy is necessary to
find out how to use analogies more properly and effectively in science teach-
ing.
Because perception plays an important role in students’ cognition, a variety
of visualization methods such as demonstrations and computer simulations
can be helpful for students to construct understanding. University physics
courses are primarily abstract and this is perhaps why students feel physics is
hard to learn. A demonstration or simulation can make the concept and physi-
Figure 2. A pattern of students’ preconceptions.
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cal process visible and therefore is helpful. Studies have documented the
effectiveness of visualization in science teaching and learning. For example, we
and our colleagues have developed computer simulations to address common
preconceptions in physics. Through these simulations students can input their
predictions and observe the consequences of their predictions. An experimen-
tal study confirms the effectiveness of these simulations in enhancing student
conceptual learning (Zhou et al., 2005).
Because some preconceptions appear to be more fundamental than others,
these preconceptions need to be treated with more attention. In this study we
found that the relationship between motion and force was at the center of
students’ concepts in mechanics. More effort, therefore, should be directed to
the instruction of the First Law of Newtonian physics, which conceptually
clarifies the relationship of motion and force. Unfortunately, the First Law was
only briefly described in the courses observed. Instead, most of the class time
was devoted to the Second Law and its applications. Teachers were more
interested in applying the Second Law in various problem settings than in
conceptually strengthening the First Law or showing how the First and Second
Laws work together.
Before ending the article we provide some discussion on a frequently asked
question about student preconceptions: Why are preconceptions so resistant to
change? The first reason is that preconceptions are much closer to student
experiences than scientific concepts. Students’ preconceptions are formed in
their everyday life environment and are situation-dependent as our study
found. In most cases these preconceptions have sufficient power to provide
plausible explanations of students’ experiences. In contrast, scientific concepts
are abstracted and generalized from research results. They are, therefore, much
more abstract and relatively further from what students see, hear, and feel in
daily life.
The second reason is that the transition from preconceptions to scientific
notions requires great intelligence. In the history of physics, physicists such as
Newton and Descartes did not agree on the concepts of force, kinetic energy,
momentum, and so forth. Descartes took momentum as the fundamental con-
cept of motion. Newton, however, put the concept of force at the center of
dynamics. In Newton’s Principia there still exists confusion in the use of the
force concept. Newton called applied force moving force and inertia intrinsic
force, resisting force, or inertia force. The struggle of these great physicists over the
concepts of force and motion is an indicator of the difficulty that students have
in grasping these concepts.
The third reason is our teaching process. As we observe, physics instruction
often took place in the following format: the instructor did a demonstration,
and to interpret this demonstration, he introduced a new concept. This process
has a similar logic to students’ everyday thinking. As we understand from this
study, students adopt a model to interpret what they have experienced. The
metaphorical and phenomenological feature of preconceptions implies the
existence of inconsistency in students’ thinking. We need to address the consis-
tency of science that represents the merit of science over student everyday
cognition by generalizing the scientific concepts to more cases. We need to
teach students that a “successful” explanation of a special case is not enough to
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generate a theory from a hypothesis. This meta-knowledge about science is
useful for students to make decisions on conceptual change.
Earlier studies reported in the literature have documented some useful
suggestions about teaching for conceptual change. We hope our findings about
student cognition provide further insights for the future effort in developing
effective teaching strategies that help students with conceptual change. Based
on our study, we believe that the research on conceptual change needs to move
from a solo focus on cognitive conflict to a more comprehensive study adven-
ture. Pintrich  et al. (1993), Dole and Sinatra (1998), and Gregoire (2003) have
brought the motivational constructs into the study scope in conceptual change.
We suggest that the conceptual change study should also embrace the inves-
tigation of the roles that meta-cognition skills, criteria the science community
uses to judge knowledge claims, and the nature of science, and so forth play in
the process of conceptual change.
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